Abstract: We reexamine the well-known assignment market model in a more general and more practical environment where agents may be financially constrained. These constraints will be shown to have an important impact on the set of Walrasian equilibria. We prove that a price adjustment process will either find a unique minimal Walrasian equilibrium price vector, or exclusively validate the nonexistence of equilibrium.
Introduction
We reexamine the assignment market in a more general and more practical setting in which buyers may face financial constraints. In this market every buyer has a valuation on every indivisible item and also a limited amount of budget. His budget may be less than his valuation over some item. We are interested in the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in this market, as such an equilibrium generates an efficient allocation of scarce resources. In particular, we attempt to address the following two basic questions: How budgets will affect the set of Walrasian equilibria? How to determine whether there is no Walrasian equilibrium or not. When no bidder faces any budget constraint, this model reduces to the celebrated assignment market model as studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) , Shubik and Shapley (1972) , Crawford and Knoer (1981) , Leonard (1983) , and Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) . Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) introduced the assignment model and proved the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. Shubik and Shapley (1972) formulated the problem as 1 a cooperative game and showed that the core of the game coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors and is a closed lattice. The lattice contains a unique minimal price vector in the best interests of buyers and a unique maximum price vector in the best interests of sellers. Crawford and Knoer (1981) developed a price adjustment process which converges to a Walarasian equilibrium in the limit. Leonard (1983) discovered that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector of the market is the Vickrey-ClarkeGrove payment vector. Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) developed an ascending auction process which finds this minimum price vector and thus can induce every bidder to bid truthfully. More recently, Andersson and Erlanson (2013) proposed a mixture of ascending and descending strategy-proof auctions. Andersson and Svensson (2014) studied non-manipulable allocation rules for an extended assignment model in which prices are restricted.
In the paper we will demonstrate that financial constraints can have an important impact on the set of Walrasian equilibria. We then establish that the set is a lower semilattice, which might be empty or not a closed set anymore, in contrast to the nonempty closed lattice of the classic case without financial constraints. To address the two basic problems mentioned above, we need to work on the set denoted by N OD of feasible integer price vectors at which there is no overdemanded set of items. Given a feasible price vector, a set of items is overdemanded if the number of buyers who demand only items in the set exceeds the number of items in the set. We prove that the set N OD is a nonempty semi-lattice and contains a unique minimal integer price vector p min . We further show that if the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is not empty, then the vector p min must be the minimal integer vector in this set. Furthermore, we apply the Demange-GaleSotomayor auction to this problem and demonstrate that this auction always terminates with the price vector p min at which there is no overdemand. If there is no underdemand at p min either, then we find a Walrasian equilibrium. Otherwise, we validate the nonexistence of Walrasian equilibrium. In the early literature, Che and Gale (1998) and Maskin (2000) pointed out that financial constraints can arise in a variety of situations. They examined how to sell a single item under budget constraints; see also Zheng (2001) and Krishna (2010) . Illing and Klüh (2003) , Klemperer (2004) , and Milgrom (2004) discussed how budget constraints may have affected the sale of spectrum licenses in some situations. Hafalir, Ravi, and Sayedi (2012) studied a sealed-bid Vickrey auction for a divisible good that achieves a near Pareto efficiency. Benoît and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2009) studied auctions for selling two items to budget constrained bidders. Talman and Yang (2015) introduced a dynamic auction for the assignment model under budget constraints that finds a core allocation. Van der Laan and Yang (2016) proposed another auction for finding a constrained equilibrium which may not be in the core. None of these studies have investigated the two basic questions mentioned above which will be addressed in the current paper. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3 presents the main results.
The Model
Consider the assignment market where a seller or auctioneer wants to sell n indivisible items to m bidders. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of real items for sale and let M = {1, 2, · · · , m} denote the set of bidders. It is assumed that every bidder consumes at most one real item. In addition to the set of real items there is a dummy item, denoted by 0. The dummy item can be assigned to any number of bidders simultaneously, while any real item can be assigned only to at most one bidder. The set N 0 denotes the set N ∪ {0} of all items. The seller has for each item j ∈ N 0 a nonnegative reservation price c j below which the item will not be sold. By convention, the reservation price of the dummy item is known to be
is feasible if p 0 = 0 and p j ≥ c j for every j ∈ N . Every bidder i ∈ M attaches a monetary value to each item given by the valuation function V i : N 0 → IR. Also by convention, the value of the dummy item for every buyer i ∈ M is known to be V i (0) = 0. Every bidder i ∈ M has a nonnegative budget m i , being the maximum amount of money he can spend. Without loss of generality we assume that all seller's reservation prices and all bidders' valuations and budgets are integers, as they all are naturally measured in units of some currency. Because all V i , m i , and c j are integers, we can prove that an integer solution will be found by our proposed auction process in which the size of price adjustment is fixed at 1. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing these primitives to be real numbers and by adjusting the size of price increment in the auction process. Buying item j ∈ N 0 against price p j by bidder i ∈ M yields this bidder a utility U i equal to
By the assumption that bidders are not allowed to have a deficit in money, no bidder is willing to pay a price for any item above his budget m i . We say that bidder i ∈ M is budget or financially constrained if A feasible assignment π : M → N 0 assigns to every bidder i ∈ M precisely one item π(i) ∈ N 0 such that no real item j ∈ N is assigned to more than one bidder. A feasible assignment may assign the dummy item to several bidders. A real item j ∈ N is unassigned at feasible assignment π if there is no i ∈ M such that π(i) = j. N π = {j ∈ N | j = π(i) for all i ∈ M } denotes the set of unassigned real items at feasible assignment π.
Given a feasible price vector p, the budget set of bidder i ∈ M is defined by
and the demand set of bidder i is defined by
is the collection of most preferred items at p by bidder i within his budget set.
An item j ∈ N 0 is in the demand set D i (p) of bidder i ∈ M at feasible price vector p if and only if at p item j can be afforded and maximizes the surplus V i (k) − p k over all affordable items k. When the demand set contains multiple items, then at the given prices of the items the bidder is indifferent between any two items in his demand set. A pair (p, π) of a feasible price vector p and a feasible assignment π is said to be implementable if p π(i) ≤ m i for all i ∈ M , i.e., every bidder i ∈ M can afford to buy the item π(i) assigned to him. Note that an implementable pair (p, π) yields allocation (π, x)
If (p * , π * ) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then p * is called a (Walrasian) equilibrium or WE price vector and π * a (Walrasian) equilibrium or WE assignment.
The following example shows that financial constraints can have a significant impact on the set of Walrasian equilibria. Table 1 .
For this example we consider three cases of budget constraints. 
The equilibrium assignment is (π(1), π(2)) = (1, 2) by which bidder 1 gets item 1 and bidder 2 gets item 2, resulting in a total social value of 11. Case 2. When the two bidders are financially constrained by m 1 = 1 and m 2 = 2, the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is still a nonempty lattice given by the set
which is open from below for the price of item 1. The equilibrium assignment is (π(1), π(2)) = (2, 1) by which bidder 1 gets item 2 and bidder 2 gets item 1, resulting in a total social value of 8, less than value 11 of Case 1. Case 3. When the two bidders have budget constraints m 1 = 1 and m 2 = 1, the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is empty. The market has no equilibrium.
Case 3 in Example 1 may suggest that the emptiness of the set of Walrasian equilibria is caused by the fact that the bidders' budgets are equal to each other. The next example shows that this need not to be the case. Budget constraints can affect considerably the set of Walrasian equilibria regardless of whether they are equal or unequal. Table 2 .
Suppose p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Then we must have p 1 ≤ 3 and p 2 ≤ 5. Otherwise no bidder would demand any real item. When p 2 = p 1 + 2, we have 
Main Results
For a nonempty set of real items S ⊆ N and a feasible price vector p, define the lower inverse demand set of S at p by
is the set of bidders who demand at p only items in S. Note that S is a subset of real items, so any bidder i in the lower inverse demand set of S at p does not demand the dummy item and thus has a positive surplus V i (j) − p j for any item j in his demand set D i (p). Define the upper inverse demand set of S at p by
is the set of bidders that demand at p at least one of the items in S. Note that the latter set contains the former set. Let |A| denote the cardinality of a finite set A.
Definition 3.1
Let p be a feasible price vector.
A nonempty set of real items
The notion of minimal overdemanded set is used in Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) and the notion of underdemanded set can be found in Sotomayor (2002) and Mishra and Talman (2010) . Note that a feasible price vector p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if at p there is neither underdemand nor overdemand.
The first lemma is due to van der Laan and Yang (2016, p.124, Lemma 3.4) and will be invoked.
Lemma 3.2
Let T be a minimal overdemanded set at feasible price vector p and let T be a nonempty proper subset of T . Then
For any p, q ∈ IR n+1 , let min(p, q) denote the componentwise minimum of p and q, and max(p, q) the componentwise maximum of p and q. A set X ⊆ IR n+1 is a lower semi-lattice if X contains min(p, q) for any p, q ∈ X. The set X is a lattice if X contains both min(p, q) and max(p, q) for any p, q ∈ X. Let N OD denote the set of feasible integer price vectors at which there is no overdemand. The next lemma shows that N OD is a lower semi-lattice.
Lemma 3.3
The set N OD is a nonempty lower semi-lattice.
Proof. Clearly, the set N OD is not empty. Consider any p, q ∈ N OD. Then r = min(p, q) is also a feasible integer price vector. Denote
Suppose there is overdemand at r and let T be a minimal overdemanded set at r. Thus |D
. By definition at least one of these two sets is not empty. Suppose T + is not empty. According to Lemma 3.2 we have that
Since r j = p j for every j ∈ S + ∪ S and r j = q j < p j for every j ∈ S − , it follows that
implying that T + is overdemanded at p. This contradicts that p ∈ N OD. Similarly, when T − is not empty, we obtain that T − is overdemanded at q, contradicting that q ∈ N OD.
2
The proof of Lemma 3.3 and Example 1 show that the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is a lower semi-lattice, which is not necessarily closed. Lemma 3.3 implies the following corollary, saying that there is a minimal integer price vector at which there is no overdemand. Note that this generalizes the well-known fact that for the model without budget constraints there is a unique minimal Walrasian equilibrium (integer) price vector. Let the price vector p min be defined by p min j = min p∈N OD p j for all j ∈ N 0 .
Corollary 3.4 It holds that p min ∈ N OD.
The next lemma states that when p is an integer Walrasian equilibrium price vector, then any q ∈ N OD satisfying q ≤ p is also a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Lemma 3.5 If q, p ∈ N OD, q p, and p is a WE price vector, then q is a WE price vector.
Proof. Let π be a Walrasian equilibrium assignment at p. We show that there exists a Walrasian equilibrium assignment ρ at q. Define S = {j ∈ N | q j < p j }. Note that S is nonempty. Since p is a WE price vector, we have that S is neither overdemanded nor underdemanded at p, i.e.,
Because q j < p j for every j ∈ S, we have that
. Hence, we must have that |D + S (p)| ≤ |S|, otherwise S is overdemanded at q. It follows that |D + S (p)| = |S|. Since q j < p j for every j ∈ S, we have that p j > c j for every item j ∈ S. Therefore, at p every item j ∈ S is assigned to a bidder. However, only the bidders in the set D 
we can set ρ(h) = π(h), i.e. every bidder not in D + S (p) gets at q the same item as at p. Moreover, for every bidder h ∈ M \ D + S (p) it holds that π(h) ∈ N 0 \ S. Further, for any item j ∈ N π we have that q j = p j = c j and j ∈ N \ S, because all items in S are assigned in π. Also at q these items can stay at the seller. It remains to show that all items in S can be assigned at q to the bidders in D + S (p). Suppose there is a nonempty subset T ⊆ S that is underdemanded at q, so the number of bidders that demand items from T at q is less than |T |. Because the bidders in D + S (p) only demand items from S at q, this implies that at q at least |D + S (p)| − (|T | − 1) bidders only demand items from S \ T . With |D + S (p)| = |S| it then follows that S \ T is overdemanded at q, which contradicts that q ∈ N OD. So, at q there is no underdemanded subset T of S and there is also no overdemand. Further only the bidders in D + S (p) demand items from S. This implies that we can choose ρ such that it assigns any item in S to a bidder in D + S (p) and reversely assigns to every bidder h in D + S (p) an item from S in its demand set D h (q). Hence, ρ is a
Walrasian equilibrium assignment at q. 2
The next corollary follows immediately from Corollary 3.4 and Lemma 3.5. 
